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  1 
Rethinking the Modern Prince: 
Partisanship and the Democratic Ethos 
 
 
This article lays out and defends the role of political parties in cultivating a democratic ethos 
amongst citizens. It argues that citizens’ commitment to the democratic idea of self-rule requires 
positive conviction in the worth of collective political agency, and suggests that this conviction draws 
on three main sources, characterised as normative, motivational and executive.  The article shows 
theoretically why parties are able to cultivate all three sources in a way no other political actor can 
match, thus constituting a unique and indispensable mode of civic engagement. Moreover, it proposes 
that the widely-noted shortcomings of parties in contemporary democracy leave this basic capacity 
unimpaired, indeed that certain important developments herald renewed opportunities.
*
 
 
 
A number of recent studies have sought to capture processes of change in contemporary 
democracies by reference to ideas of ‘depoliticisation’ (Mair 2006), ‘citizen disaffection’ 
(Schmitter 1995) or ‘political malaise’ (Offe 2006).  These words imply that something 
to whose presence we have become accustomed, and which has perhaps played an 
important ethical role in democratic life, is in danger of being lost, though quite what the 
thing is remains contested.  Some diagnoses focus on the rise of policy-making by non-
majoritarian institutions, seeing in this the erosion or the streamlining of democratic 
practices.  Others focus on decreasing levels of political participation and an increase in 
electoral volatility.  Still others focus on the narrowing of political choices made 
available to voters at election time.  Most accounts give at least some of these 
developments a critical reading, noting how they tend to weaken the ability of citizens 
directly to influence policy-making, or how they increase political alienation and deprive 
institutions of democratic legitimacy (Offe 2006).  
At the heart of these concerns seems to be the vitality of the democratic ethos 
itself, understood as a positive conviction amongst citizens of the worth of engaging 
with collective political agency so as to exercise the fundamental democratic principle of 
collective self-rule.  This paper explores the conditions necessary to the maintenance of 
this conviction, and advances an ideal-typical conception of the role of political parties 
in promoting it.  It does so not by providing a comprehensive empirical account of the 
current challenges faced by parties in Western countries, or by seeking to offer a positive 
causal model for contemporary processes – these issues have already been carefully 
explored by other scholars.  Rather, the paper takes a distinctly theoretical route.  It 
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begins by suggesting that, at least since the advent of democracy as collective self-rule, 
conviction in the worth of collective political agency has drawn on three sources: first, 
an ability amongst citizens to articulate political ideals that can be addressed through 
collective action (the normative source); second, a willingness to see these goals as ours, 
in the sense that our own fate or that of those with whom we identify is bound up in their 
achievement, and that they may require ‘our’ collective engagement to be met (the 
motivational source); and third an understanding that political agency can be 
institutionally applied to secure them (the executive source).  The article then examines 
which modes of civic engagement, if any, can nourish these sources, and argues that the 
crucial role is best played by political parties.  The paper goes on to show that although 
there are other forms of civic activity which are able to cultivate some of the three 
sources mentioned, the party is unique in being able to address all.                                                                                                                                                                                    
In contemporary scholarship, despite the industry with which empirical research 
on parties continues to be conducted, their centrality in rendering meaningful the idea of 
collective self-rule is often forgotten.  Parties are acknowledged as exercising an 
important procedural role, organising the mechanisms of government, legislation and the 
selection of office-holders, and they are recognised as a key component in the idea of 
representation, notwithstanding increasing doubts about their capacities in this regard 
(Dalton and Wattenberg 2002).  But rather less attention is given to the role of parties in 
cultivating a broader democratic ethos.  Such an ethos, in addition to the liberal virtues 
of tolerance and respect of individual rights, entails a commitment to the idea of dealing 
collectively with matters of common concern.  It implies the conviction amongst citizens 
that self-government is possible and desirable.  As we shall note, parties and their 
relationship to society have changed significantly in recent decades, yet their importance 
to the idea of democracy, and to some of its most significant practices, persists.  By 
exploring their role as essential modes of civic engagement necessary to cultivate 
conviction in the worth of political agency, the intention is to contribute to a wider 
rethinking of the place of political parties and partisanship in contemporary democracy 
(Muirhead 2006) (Rosenblum 2008) (Biezen and Saward 2008).
1
   
 
 
Three Sources of Commitment to Political Agency 
 
It is often emphasised that one of the most fundamental features of democratic politics 
has to do with the possibility of connecting political agency to collectively determined 
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goals.  “Government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented”, to 
use J. S. Mill’s definition (Mill 1861, ch. 7), is what democracy ultimately means, and it 
holds true for any conception which takes seriously the idea of collective self-rule and 
not merely the constitutional restraint of authority.  The recognition by citizens that 
certain situations are a matter of concern, and that they can and should be addressed in 
common rather than by individual adaptation, is what publicises them and makes them 
relevant to decision-making by democratic means.  A political community that can 
adequately be regarded as democratic is one in which the citizenry holds on to the basic 
conviction that political engagement is for these reasons meaningful, notwithstanding 
the possible limitations of existing structures and practices.  
Yet a question more rarely explored concerns the conditions under which 
conviction in the worth of political agency can be strengthened and reproduced.  For 
simply the existence of institutional structures to some degree responsive to public 
influence hardly suffices to ensure its endurance.  A democratic ethos requires that the 
idea of collective self-rule be given focus and rendered meaningful to citizens.  While 
this issue has been widely problematised by republican political theorists, scholars with 
purely normative interests have often taken civic engagement for granted as a natural 
inclination of citizens, leaving the sources necessary to cultivate it unexamined.  In this 
section we argue that a democratic ethos may be seen as drawing nourishment from 
three sources: normative, motivational and executive, understood as explicitly political 
in focus.  Let us consider these in turn. 
The normative source concerns the ends of political action and the principles by 
which they are inspired.  It involves the appreciation that there are political goals which 
deserve to be pursued, and that there is a relationship between them such that they need 
to be pursued as part of a more or less coherent whole.  Cultivating this source involves 
giving political shape to the grievances which are manifest in society, to the 
dissatisfactions which persist despite outward appearances of consensus, and connecting 
these to normatively grounded, powerful notions of the possibility of a better society.  It 
involves appeals to general interests and/or to political values such as freedom, justice 
and equality, and implies analysing conflicts between these, identifying normative 
priorities in particular historical circumstances, and combining them to address 
substantive political problems (White a, 2010).
2
  
The normative source is necessary to guide citizens’ critical appraisal of their 
joint political institutions, to allow them to form judgments on matters of common 
concern, and to articulate such judgments in a way that could appeal to the 
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understanding of all.  In its absence the quality of political judgments formed by citizens 
would inevitably suffer, they would be unable to share their concerns with others in a 
coherent way, and the lack of a larger perspective on the basis of which to assess the role 
and conduct of political representatives would render them vulnerable to political 
manipulation.
3
  Political agency would not be worth engaging with because there would 
be no shared political ends to speak of; citizens’ interactions with each other would be 
either entirely parochial or grounded on interests which they would be unable to defend 
or negotiate from a non-solipsistic perspective.  Indeed, even the assessment of political 
institutions based on purely private interests requires availing oneself of normative 
sources.  Without these, citizens would be unable to express their interests in a way that 
is meaningful and could be understood, if not immediately agreed upon, by the rest of 
the citizen-body.   
Whether phrased in the language of interests, values or problems, active political 
engagement of this kind requires putting forward interpretations of the common good 
designed to appeal to a wide variety of citizens.  Such interpretations are normative first 
in the sense that they involve the adoption of justifiable positions on basic aspects of 
human affairs and the life in common where ‘facts’ underdetermine how these positions 
should look.  The meaning of basic political values can be developed in different ways, 
and no simple appeal to reality can adjudicate between these.  In this sense, all political 
orientations – including those which depart little from the common-sense views or 
‘centre ground’ of their particular historical moment – contain normative elements.  
Even a pragmatic politics of problem-solving never fully divests itself of such elements.
4
  
Yet interpretations of the good which are normative in a deeper sense are marked by 
certain patterns of coherence and continuity, such that different aspects of the political 
world are linked together across subject and time rather than each taken piecemeal.  In 
order to inspire a commitment to ongoing political agency – and not just the fulfilment 
of an isolated cause, whose resolution then results in democratic disengagement – links 
must be drawn across political issues so as to project a degree of coherence onto the 
complexity of the political world and to highlight the necessity of democratic political 
action.  Similar patterns of coherence and continuity need not, of course, be so 
encompassing as to conjure a closed ideational system (even accepting such a 
possibility); indeed they may allow for ongoing revision and reinterpretation of political 
judgments according to the requirements of public reason-giving.
5
  
Naturally the recognition that certain normative goals are worth pursuing is 
unlikely on its own to generate real commitment to the exercise of political agency.  One 
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can believe that something needs to be addressed in a certain way without supposing 
that it is a matter for ‘us’ – the onus (or privilege) may be assumed to fall to others, 
whether remote in space or time.
6
  Thus the normative source of conviction needs 
further motivational support, and it is this motivational source which is the second in our 
typology.  This consists in the availability and promotion of the discursive resources and 
forms of engagement by which citizens can perceive themselves as political subjects.  
The dissemination of these, and thus the building of political constituencies whose 
members feel a sense of common purpose and are inclined to show solidarity towards 
one another, is crucial if the normative goals just discussed are to be met with an 
impulse to see them realised.  There needs to be the conviction that these ends are in 
some way ‘ours’ and need to be pursued through action in common rather than 
individually, else there is likely to be little emotional engagement with them and little 
sense of indignation or disappointment if they are inadequately fulfilled.  Without the 
feeling of belonging to one or several collective ‘we’s, conviction in the worth of joint 
action is likely to be absent, and efforts to advance political programmes in the face of 
opposition are likely to have little resonance with citizens, who may treat them rather as 
squabbling amongst elites (White a, 2010).  Only where the motivational source is 
present is disenchantment amongst citizens towards political institutions likely to take 
the form of active mobilisation rather than cynicism or disinterest. 
Moreover, in order to be supportive of the worth of political agency, this sense of 
collective subjecthood needs to have an explicitly political focus.  It needs to be bound 
up in the idea of pursuing shared political projects which can only be achieved 
collectively through individuals acting in concert: forms of collective identification 
which lack this are as likely to inspire a retreat into the private sphere as a receptiveness 
to political engagement.  It may be that some such forms of subjecthood draw on the 
symbolic resources associated with bonds of cultural commonality, or on the ties of 
solidarity associated with pre-existing social groupings, though as the modern world 
becomes increasingly fluid and as individuals engage in increasingly diverse forms of 
identification this pattern may become rarer.  In any case, to foster commitment to 
political agency these forms of subjecthood cannot simply involve a perception of 
common attributes or diffuse feelings of sympathy: they must acquire a political 
direction such that they refer to the pursuit of shared projects (Ypi 2008; Ypi 2010). 
The third element relevant to deepening conviction in the worth of political 
agency involves demonstrating that those political ends to which ‘we’ are committed 
may be successfully realised: that is, that there exists the political power and means 
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needed to tackle them.  It is this projection of the successful execution of political 
programmes which demonstrates, in the form of visible outcomes, the credibility of 
political agency.  Demonstrations of this kind are likely, in many cases, to involve the 
application of legal means: they require using the coercive power of institutions to 
transform ideas into rules of societal regulation.  Popular sovereignty obtains tangible 
expression for citizens only when the normative ideals they engage with are transformed 
into practice-orienting rules, reshaping the conduct of both individual and institutional 
actors.  Citizens need not necessarily understand the workings of parliaments, 
government and other bureaucratic institutions in their most intricate details – the 
complexity of modern democracy makes this most unlikely – but some sense that they 
all, in concert, can serve meaningful ends is indispensable (White b, 2010).   
Note that this source cannot be subsumed under the normative and motivational 
ones, since it does not rely for its effect on an identity between those programmes 
successfully executed at a given moment and those which are dear to ‘us’.  Indeed, this 
would undermine the very objective of the political process, which is to confront and 
select particular views on the common good in the midst of a plurality of conflicting 
perspectives.  If all political ideals could be endorsed by all citizens at all times, politics 
would be superfluous: the government of people might as well be replaced by the 
administration of things, as Saint Simon urged.  What matters in this context is the 
perception that political ideals, in general, can be feasibly realised.  Even where some 
groups of citizens oppose the particular programmes of specific actors, they may still be 
convinced of the meaningfulness of political agency insofar as it succeeds in leaving an 
institutional imprint.    
One may propose, then, that it is the erosion of these three sources – normative, 
motivational and executive – which leads to democratic disengagement and a loss of 
conviction in the worth of political agency.  In the absence of the normative source, 
citizens may experience powerful feelings of dissatisfaction with the social and political 
world yet will be weakly able to articulate these, tending rather to a state of resentful 
bewilderment.  In the absence of the motivational source, the social and political world 
may be fully intelligible, yet citizens are likely to be unmoved to engage in its problems, 
thus rendering politics the activity of a small elite.  In the absence of the executive 
source, citizens may recognise the urgency of certain projects and their relevance to ‘us’, 
yet they are likely to doubt their capacity to be realised. 
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The Role of the Political Party 
 
When one or more of the three sources mentioned is absent, the likely consequence is 
democratic disengagement amongst citizens.  An effective exercise of collective self-
rule requires forms of civic engagement in which all three sources are made available.  
In what follows, we shall propose and defend the role of political parties in promoting 
this task.  Indeed, we shall argue that parties are not only well suited to cultivate these 
sources of conviction in the worth of political agency but that they respond to the 
normative, motivational and executive demands in ways that no other type of actor can 
match. 
Before proceeding we should specify further what is to be understood by 
‘political parties’ for the purposes of this discussion.  A remarkable diversity of forms 
may be subsumed under the term, ranging from catch-all parties to cartel parties, 
reformist parties to anti-system parties, nationalist parties to religious parties, and many 
besides.  Indeed, the application of the term is never politically neutral, and groupings 
which might more appropriately be described under a different name (we shall touch on 
the contrast with ‘factions’ below) may have strategic reasons to present themselves as 
‘parties’, or may be commonly described as such by observers for the sake of 
convenience.  Our own conception, expressed in the three roles we discuss, should be 
understood as an ideal type.  It is clearly rooted in empirical reality, drawing inspiration 
from the roles parties have historically performed and, as we shall argue, may still 
perform, yet it is also informed by our reading of the ethos to which citizens in a 
democracy are generally understood to aspire.  As a model, it is intended not merely to 
describe reality but to regulate the observations and evaluations one makes of it, to draw 
attention to what partisans at their best may achieve, and to highlight those cases where 
such achievements are unmet.  Perhaps no existing party fits the model precisely, but 
nor should it be regarded as an ideal formed in disregard of practical conditions.   
Let us take each of the three elements discussed in the previous section in turn.  
The normative one is perhaps one of the most distinctive features of parties, and has 
been well-captured in the definitions of authors as diverse in political orientation and 
historical background as Burke and Gramsci.  For Burke, a party is ‘a body of men 
united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some 
particular principle in which they are all agreed’ (Burke 1770, p.271).  For Gramsci, the 
party represents ‘the modern prince’, ‘the first cell in which there come together the 
germs of a collective will tending to become universal and total’ (Gramsci 1971, p.129).  
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Gramsci’s reflection on Machiavelli is particularly instructive here.  For Gramsci, the 
aim of Machiavelli’s “Prince” was not to depict the political biography of a historically 
existing figure but to articulate a theoretical reflection on political agency able to move 
beyond both existing treaties on political utopia and the pedantic realism contained in 
the mirror-for-princes literature.  Gramsci’s conceptualisation of the party as the 
‘modern prince’ aimed to capture, from a theoretical perspective, the role of artificially 
constructed agents in addressing the issue of political reform from a particular 
perspective, sensitive both to the normative force of universal ideals such as freedom 
and equality, and to the historical circumstances in which a specific combination of 
them obtained particular significance.   
That parties, properly understood, have a special role in articulating 
interpretations of the public good has been a staple theme for those philosophers who 
have addressed the question of their place in a healthy democracy.  Voltaire, in his 
Dictionnaire philosophique as well as the entry on ‘faction’ that he contributed to the 
Encyclopedia, uses the normative focus of parties as the basis of a distinction with 
‘faction’.  A faction for him represents a ‘seditious party’, something which is ‘still 
weak’ and does not ‘participate in the state’ (Voltaire 1752, p. 319), whereas parties 
constitute a unique mode of civic engagement serving the general interest by expressing 
distinctive visions on the future of the polity.  Montesquieu follows Voltaire on this, 
arguing that while factions build their allegiances on particularistic interests and egoistic 
causes, parties reflect the position of a collective on matters of common concern.  As he 
argues, their role is essential to ensuring citizens’ participation in accordance with a 
political ideal of the good polity: ‘what is spoken of as union of the political body is in 
fact something very ambiguous, the true one is a union of harmony, following which all 
the parties, albeit seemingly opposed to each other, concur to the common good, just 
like some dissonances in music concur to the overall harmony’ (Montesquieu 1734, ch. 
IX).   
This normative role, it should be noted, tends to be badly captured in political-
science accounts of parties inspired by rational-choice or economic perspectives.  
Following an aggregative model of politics, parties are generally conceived as seeking to 
represent preferences which are given, and as distinguishing themselves mainly by the 
combinations of interests to which they appeal.  Partisans’ concern to remain faithful to 
these interests is held to be conditioned by their own interest in maximising their appeal 
to the ‘median voter’, and thereby securing and retaining office (Downs 1957) 
(Schlesinger 1991).  Yet even parties which speak only the language of interests are in 
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no sense merely a passive medium of representation – not to mention those which make 
explicit appeal beyond interests to reflexively chosen values.  Interests have to be 
selected, defined and articulated compatibly with a certain idea of mutual advantage, 
and it seems hardly possible to perform this role without reference to principles of some 
kind.
7
  Such oversight in this literature is ironic, given that it is this aspect of parties 
which marks their most important contribution to realising the idea of democracy as 
collective self-rule.  Unless one acknowledges their role in advancing normative 
interpretations of the collective good, rather than simply their organisational dimension 
as clientelist networks that maximise the likelihood that certain individuals attain the 
votes needed for political office (Downs 1957), one has little reason to see anything 
distinctive or attractive about democracy as a regime form (Goodin 2008, pp. 204-224).  
Without the normative dimension of parties, voters can select representatives only with 
reference to a narrow range of personal characteristics (competence, integrity, the extent 
to which they resemble ‘me’).  Politics becomes purely the ‘politics of presence’ 
(Phillips 1994).  No doubt some parties may compromise their normative commitments 
on certain occasions (opportunism), perhaps so as to take immediate advantage of 
opportunities for institutional power, and undoubtedly normative commitments are 
adjusted over time (pragmatism), perhaps because earlier positions are deemed 
unworkable or no longer relevant.  But if one treats these purely as a sequence of ad hoc 
manoeuvres, rather than as acts of deviation and repositioning relative to ongoing 
ideational commitments, one will have left no space for democratic politics as collective 
self-rule. 
When we move to the motivational element, we find again that parties are of 
peculiar relevance.  For they have the capacity to generate a sense of political 
collectivity amongst citizens, both by articulating political identities and giving visible 
expression to their cross-temporal and cross-spatial reality, and by projecting a sense of 
common purpose in pursuit of a political project.  Because they involve multiple 
individuals acting in concert, parties can cohere as political entities beyond the life-
spans and career-spans of individuals, thus giving a sense of continuity of struggle 
across periods.  They act as the carriers of political memory, as well as the embodiment 
of collective will.  Such a mode of civic engagement expresses and reinforces the 
individual’s sense of place within a wider constituency.  Of course, parties do not 
construct such constituencies from scratch: they draw considerably on the discursive 
resources which pre-exist them in society.  But only parties – and to some extent social 
movements, as discussed below – can elaborate explicitly political identities, which 
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citizens do not passively inherit as part of their social experiences and position within 
society, but towards which they orientate themselves reflexively based on an evaluation 
of the associated political objectives (Urbinati 2006, pp. 36 ff.).  And while individuals 
may develop distinctive normative perspectives and run for political office with the 
claim to promote them, only parties can credibly embody the continuous and 
coordinated action required to realise specific values in practice, to take on other 
organised actors in political struggle and overcome them.   
Again, it is a role which much of the political-science literature on parties tends 
to ignore.  Seeing parties primarily as mechanisms of passive representation, these 
accounts tend to assume a largely unidirectional relationship between the forms of 
subjecthood existing in society and those in the political arena.  Political constituencies 
tend to be seen as a function of underlying societal cleavages, whether rooted in interests 
or sedimented cultural oppositions (e.g. Rokkan and Lipset 1967), with the groups 
involved in these cleavage structures assumed to be already endowed with a sense of 
collective identity (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, p.210).  They are treated already as 
groups for themselves as well as in themselves, in other words: the role of the party in 
developing this self-consciousness, by creatively articulating political subjects, is often 
under-specified.  The literature on ‘linkage’ between parties and citizens (or state and 
society) also tends to suppose interaction between two pre-defined groupings rather than 
an ongoing process of mutual constitution.  While some of the classic accounts note that 
party activities are in no sense entirely derivative of cleavage structures – not all 
cleavages are translated into dimensions of political conflict, and parties have some 
degree of creative role in shaping as well as responding to citizen preferences (Sartori 
1976) – even these accounts tend to have little to say about the creative role of parties in 
defining their constituency and thereby offering citizens ways of understanding not just 
their preferences but their very selves. 
Parties are equally significant when we consider the third, executive source of 
conviction in the worth of political agency.  For only parties are in a position to 
demonstrate in full the capacities of government for implementing public policies 
responsive to the democratic process.  Parties serve two purposes here: they render 
political contestation possible, and they render it comprehensible.  In their absence one 
may still have political decision-making of some kind: even where all representatives of 
a decision-making chamber have been elected as individuals rather as members of a 
party, they may organise votes and thereby choose policies, perhaps forming ad hoc 
coalitions on each piece of legislation (Goodin 2008, pp.205-211).  They may also, as 
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individuals, secure certain basic advantages for the constituency which elected them – 
improvements in local infrastructure, for example.  But there cannot be organised 
agenda-setting such that a programme with some basic level of normative coherence is 
translated into policies.  The policy proposals on which votes are taken will be drawn up 
piecemeal and in isolation, perhaps each sponsored by a different representative, and 
unless practices of ideas-based cooperation between representatives across issues start to 
emerge (i.e. parties emerge) there will be no discernible coherence in these decisions – 
either in their origins or in the justifications retrospectively given to them.  There will 
therefore be little sense that the resultant policies are expressions of collective political 
agency – indeed, given the self-contradictory results which decision-making by a 
sequence of votes can produce, there is a strong probability that some will look 
decidedly arbitrary.
8
  Even where there is rudimentary coordination, the premises on 
which it rests will not be subject to organised contestation.  Shared normative 
perspectives will emerge as the prerequisite of coordination, but they will remain largely 
tacit and unproblematised unless organised groupings emerge to challenge them.  Nor 
will there be any mechanism by which the experiences of policy-making, including their 
successes and failures, and the practical knowledge representatives acquire in the course 
of governing, are able to feed back into normative political visions.  In sum, without 
parties there will be a chaotic or opaque quality to decision-making which gives citizens 
no reason to take normative objectives seriously, and which therefore precludes 
widespread conviction of the worth of collective political agency.  
Undeniably, while the presence of parties seems a necessary condition for 
provision of the executive source, it may not be sufficient at all times.  There may be 
cases when its provision is undermined by an ineffective government bureaucracy which 
fails to respond to the outcomes of political contestation, or when the major media 
outlets systematically under-report the activities of the legislature or diminish their 
ideational basis.  Moreover, one of the strategies of opposition parties is likely to be to 
try to cultivate the perception that the execution of policy-making is weak or disjointed.  
For parties in government, convincing citizens of the efficacy of their decision-making – 
in addition to its normative desirability – will evidently be one of the challenges of 
office.  But though it is a case that needs to be made, it is a case made possible by party-
led coordination amongst political representatives.  
 
 
Three Alternatives to the Party 
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The argument we have sketched faces a number of objections.  Perhaps most 
importantly, even those who acknowledge that parties have played these roles at certain 
points in the history of democracy may want to argue that under contemporary 
conditions there are other actors which may perform them equally well or better.  In this 
section we examine three alternative actors and show how each of them is able to 
perform one, perhaps two, but not all three of the roles identified above, thus failing to 
cultivate conviction in the worth of political agency along the dimensions specified. 
The first alternative perspective might consider social movements rooted in civil 
society as performing largely the same function (Tilly & Tarrow 2007).  Social 
movements and parties may be distinguished, at least at a definitional level, by the fact 
that while both attempt to define and raise support for collective goals, and seek to do so 
over a sustained period of time, social movements focus on a more narrowly defined set 
of issues and do not seek to hold office themselves.  Due to organisational and financial 
constraints, social movements tend to be most successful when they focus their energies 
on a closely delimited set of campaigns (Offe 1990), which means the majority of them 
are unlikely to develop comprehensive political visions and attempt to transform 
political institutions in accordance with these.  Their strategy is to make claims on 
governments and the institutions of state without seeking to become part of their ruling 
administrations.  But this very fact seems to make social movements unsuited to 
maintaining expectations of collective political agency by means of the executive role 
described above.  Not only do they reject institutionalisation, but they reject the power 
which comes with this.  The most they will be able to project therefore is the capacity to 
influence the governmental agenda – not the capacity to design it and execute it 
independently.  This is not to say that they do not exert an important influence on the 
public sphere, simply that their rejection of integration into mainstream institutional 
politics is likely to render them inadequate to perform the executive role without support 
from other political actors.  
Where social movements may contribute most to the fulfilment of the three roles 
identified is with regard to the motivational role.  Historically, such movements have 
been distinctly successful at articulating collective subjects oriented to the pursuit of 
specific political goals, based for instance on categories of social income, gender, race 
and sexuality.  Moreover, their ability to create networks of activists, to transfer 
information, and to engage in awareness-raising campaigns has been widely documented 
(Della Porta 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Social movements are undoubtedly a 
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significant alternative provider of motivational resources in times when parties are weak.  
What they cannot do is substitute for parties on all of the three roles described above.  
Furthermore their inability or unwillingness to engage in the executive role may end up 
undermining conviction in the worth of political agency amongst citizens who are not 
activists.  The risk that these latter perceive the work of movements as well-intentioned 
yet utopian may lead to a sceptical if sympathetic attitude, thus contributing to a 
weakening of the democratic ethos. 
If one of the arguments against social movements from a party-centred 
perspective is that they are unable to cultivate the executive source, parties themselves 
have often been subjected to a similar critique from those emphasising the reality of 
corporate pluralism (Schmitter 1974).  Neocorporatist authors maintain that the role of 
parties in articulating or channelling institutional proposals and dictating the priorities of 
public policy has been increasingly replaced by direct communication between 
specialised interest groups and state agencies.  Rather than following what Rokkan has 
termed the ‘partisan-electoral’ channel, political representation – neocorporatists 
emphasise – increasingly takes the form of a direct relation between formal, 
hierarchically-ordered associations (e.g. trade unions) and state agencies.  Whilst 
providing organised interest-groups with recognition, legitimation and a certain 
‘representational monopoly’ vis-à-vis alternative actors, state agencies trade such 
benefits with the possibility to maintain control over their selection of leaders, the kind 
of pressure exercised on the political system, and the articulation of political demands 
(Schmitter 1974).  This has naturally raised doubts about the role of parties, and indeed 
parliamentary government more generally, in the delivery of public policy, and has led 
some to question whether liberal corporatism may be on the point of superseding 
democratically elected institutions (Lehmbruch 1979, p. 149). 
The limits of this alternative proposal emerge if we assess the issue of political 
representation from a more normative perspective.  Without denying the relevance of 
organised interest-groups in the execution of public policy, it is this type of critique of 
corporate actors that reminds why political parties remain relevant.  Indeed while the 
latter constitute modes of civic engagement with a view to promoting the collective 
political good, and try to appeal to the reasons of all, corporate actors renounce this 
ambition by definition.  Hence they appear particularly vulnerable to the democratic 
critique of factional groups, well captured in the words of Rousseau: “when particular 
interests begin to make themselves felt, and small societies to influence the larger 
society, the common interest diminishes, and meets with opposition […] the general will 
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is no longer the will of all, contradictions and disagreements arise, and the best opinion 
no longer carries the day unchallenged” (Rousseau 1762, p. 121-122).  Of course, if one 
views parties only as agents aggregating self-evident interests in a competitive way, one 
will have trouble seeing the difference.  Indeed their function would be reduced to 
merely replicating what corporate actors already do in more powerful ways.  But if we 
take seriously their role as ‘discursive architects’, providing a variety of normative 
resources upon which to draw in deliberating upon competing policy options with a 
view to the collective political good, then parties cannot be so easily discarded.  As 
Norberto Bobbio emphasises, while the ‘sectional representation’ offered by interest 
groups may be appropriate to numerous sub-domains of public life, in the political arena 
it cannot substitute for the advocacy of general visions provided by parties (Bobbio 
1987, p.51).  The very process by which the interests of corporate actors are integrated is 
subject to political negotiation, the modality of incorporation depends on the importance 
ascribed to specific interests at any given time and may be subject to different normative 
assessments.   
If, as Rousseau exhorts us, we should be suspicious of interests entering the 
public sphere in an unmediated way, then the best way to counter their disruptive effects 
is to elaborate policies of dealing with them through the open, deliberative and 
normatively-informed environment that parties make available.  The role of parties thus 
cannot be replaced by corporate agents.  They may be powerful, but they cannot be 
directly controlled by citizens, nor can they modify what they stand for in accordance 
with public expectations of collective agency and normative ideas of the good polity.  
To normalise them at the expense of parties would be to sacrifice the idea of collective 
self-rule to that of absolute rule by the strongest interest group(s) (Kelsen 2000, p.93).  
Hence rather than relieving the symptoms of democratic disengagement, corporate 
actors run the risk of merely aggravating the disease.  They may well perform the 
executive role we have associated with parties, and sometimes even the motivational 
one, but they cannot substitute for them in performing the normative role.  
If the critique to corporate actors as alternative political agents focuses on their 
failure to provide the resources for informed and non-egoistic political deliberation, 
parties themselves have been often subjected to an analogous critique.  One of the 
standard objections advanced by theorists of deliberative democracy is that they lie at 
the heart of a process in which only preference-aggregation matters, not the reasons 
citizens might have for expressing those particular preferences.  Of course, as 
emphasised, no party aggregates votes automatically: some measure of deliberation is 
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unavoidable.  Perhaps why defenders of deliberative democracy really object to party-
centred political agency is on the grounds that parties foster commitment to oppositional 
activity rather than encouraging engagement with the opponent’s argument (Young 
2001, p. 671).  Hence comes the deliberative democrat’s emphasis on discourse, 
reciprocal argumentation and consent.  Whether conceived as electronic improvements 
on familiar mechanisms of deliberation (Lupia and Matsuaka 2004), citizens’ juries and 
deliberative polls (Fishkin 1991) or mini-publics convening to discuss issues of common 
concern (Fung 2003), such alternative political agents have all recently been considered 
more authentic expressions of the democratic idea. 
Ironically, theoretical arguments on the superiority of deliberative fora 
proliferate as empiricists increasingly lament the tendency towards political disaffection 
and democratic disengagement (Mair 2006, p. 28).  ‘So what?’, the deliberative 
democrat, may respond.  If citizen apathy is the problem, participatory democracy might 
provide the solution.  After all, deliberative decision-making constitutes an ideal, one 
which becomes all the more appealing in the face of the failure of traditional agents such 
as parties to operate as emancipatory forces in society.  A deliberativist may be quite 
comfortable with any putative failure of partisanship, since deliberation is understood to 
be anchored in conceptions of justice that transcend the partisan perspective.  In an ideal 
speech situation, all relevant arguments emerge in debate of their own accord, and 
organised collective agency may be a source of distortion, or may limit levels of citizen 
participation (Biezen and Saward 2008; Muirhead 2006).  
Let us leave aside the conceptual question of whether the general interest may 
plausibly be conceived as something transcending partisan conflict and susceptible to 
access through a non-partisan exercise of public reason.
9
  Let us focus instead on the 
motivational capacities of deliberation.  Historically speaking, those (admittedly few) 
experiments in deliberative democracy that have left the most durable marks have been 
able to cultivate conviction in the worth of political agency only when paired with an 
additional motivational component.  They have taken shape in times of both 
commitment to the realisation of a normative ideal of the just society and widespread 
partisan engagement on the side of the citizen body.  One may think here of the soviets 
in 1917 Russia, or workers’ councils in 1917-1918 Germany, or peasants’ organisations 
in 1936-1937 Spain, or citizens’ deliberative fora in 1956 Hungary.  Even if deliberation 
is simply proposed as a normative ideal, it would be wrong to seek to abstract from the 
body of meanings and opinions derived from political conflict when constructing 
deliberative political agency.  One may confront views when one has views to confront; 
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one may try to persuade others of the worth of a political cause when a political cause is 
worth devoting oneself to; one may engage in a process of political transformation when 
a process of political transformation has been initiated.  An organised political agent is 
needed, one able to define topics of concern, to create enduring constituencies, to 
support principled alignment, and to provide a sense of shared commitment to a 
collective political project, if citizens’ conviction in the worth of collective political 
agency is to be maintained.   
Deliberative agents lack this motivational capacity: they convene on an ad hoc 
basis, and once the theme on the table has been exhausted, deliberating agents are liable 
simply to leave the room and return to their private affairs – perhaps less certain of their 
beliefs than previously.  One of the interesting findings of research on public discussion 
and deliberation is that participants tend to avoid the overt contestation of opinions, 
preferring to leave disagreement latent or, where recognising it, to avoid deeper 
engagement and argumentation over the bases of preferences (Conover, Searing and 
Crewe 2002, p.58; Duchesne and Haegel 2007, p.8, 11; Ryfe 2005).  Such acts of 
personal distancing from political conflict suggest that while political talk may 
illuminate the lines of division on which political actors can draw, it is not in itself likely 
to be the precursor to political action.  As Rosenblum puts it, ‘deliberative settings may 
be endured; participants may even be enlightened.  But it is not clear that they will be 
politically energised.’ (Rosenblum 2008, p.310).  Deliberative constituencies have no 
past and no present: no history of joint struggles and defeats, no political errors to reflect 
upon, no projects to articulate in common.  Deliberative political agents cannot replace 
parties.  This is not to say that deliberative democracy is an unworthy enterprise.  But 
rather than replacing parties with deliberative constituencies, the point is to think of 
ways to integrate the two by rendering constituencies more partisan and/or encouraging 
parties to deliberate within (Biezen and Saward 2008).
10
  
If conviction in the worth of political agency derives from three main sources – 
normative, motivational and executive – it seems that parties offer a contribution that 
none of the other familiar actors in contemporary politics can match.  Social movements 
are able to supply the normative and motivational components but lack the executive 
capacity; corporate interest groups can supply the motivational and executive 
components, but without normative resources; and deliberative fora provide the 
normative and possibly executive components, but seem to lack the capacity for 
mobilisation.  
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An Impossible Task?  Concluding Thoughts on Parties in Contemporary Democracy 
 
It is, of course, one thing to argue that political parties represent a mode of civic 
engagement indispensable to maintaining conviction in the worth of political agency, 
and quite another to insist either that currently existing parties are up to this task or that 
the future emergence of such parties can be expected.  For well might it be argued that, 
although the ideal type sketched alerts us to the fundamental yet overlooked functions 
which parties may serve, it does so ultimately so as to invite a depressing conclusion.  
Indeed, the dominant tone of contemporary academic scholarship on parties is itself 
often one of scepticism concerning what can be achieved.  While contemporary political 
theorists of most descriptions tend to be altogether silent on parties, for empiricists the 
notion that ‘parties do matter’ has come to be seen as a questionable thesis.  A sizeable 
literature observes that parties are in a state of fundamental change and perhaps long-
term decline, as membership rates fall, leaders act as disconnected cartels, electoral 
contests focus on the dramatic personalities of individuals, and processes of 
transnational integration render the established political groupings obsolete (Mair 2006; 
Crouch 2004; Ginsborg 2005).   
Accordingly, one may note that the three roles identified for parties in this article 
are currently weakly performed.  First, talk of ‘third-way’ consensi expresses the way 
normative innovation appears to be missing in mainstream politics (Mouffe 2005).  
Policy-making seems to respond more to a need to assuage transitory fears, many of 
them inflated by parties themselves, than to promote a long-term and interconnected set 
of goals.  Second, parties seem increasingly to want to construct their constituencies not 
in terms of clearly defined collective political identities but as free-floating individuals 
or ‘consumers’, who exercise ‘choice’ between party brands external to their sense of 
self rather than political programmes continuous with their self-understandings.  The 
rise of the ‘catch-all party’ (Kirchheimer 1966) has been widely documented, and held 
responsible for the increasingly amorphous voting patterns which see voters switching 
parties from one election to the next (Knutsen 2006).  Third, a whole host of concerns 
about whether the party-composition of governments has meaningful effects on the 
types of policies pursued, about trends towards presidentialist politics and the increasing 
popularity of the term ‘governance’ over ‘government’, raise doubts regarding the 
relationship between parties and decision-making (Mair 2008).  Insofar as parties 
continue to influence government and the structuring of legislative chambers, thereby 
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serving a procedural function, it is argued they do so increasingly as appendages of the 
state, as small networks of ‘managers’ concerned mainly with office-holding rather than 
as organisations responsive to the concerns of a broader array of citizens (Mair 2003).  
In the light of such patterns, democratic disengagement, understood as the loss of 
conviction in the worth of political agency, now seems a thinkable prospect, even if 
presently incomplete.   
These points would signal reason for the utmost pessimism concerning the fate 
of democracy if they could be attributed to structural changes which ruled out alternative 
paths of development.  If the argument of the preceding sections is accepted, and parties 
are indeed crucial to fostering the ethos on which democracy survives, then any 
suggestion that their task is an impossible one must be regarded as a challenge to the 
possibility of democracy.  So let us examine the plausibility of such arguments.  Are 
parties really incapable of playing the normative role?  At the extreme level, one might 
argue that, following the achievement of universal suffrage and the establishment of 
basic human rights, all worthwhile political ideals have already been realised and that 
what remains is merely a steering role – that the ‘end of history’ has indeed been 
reached.  More circumspectly, one might argue that the contemporary world is no longer 
receptive to narratives of transformation rather than pragmatic reform, and that 
principle-based thinking – whatever its merits – no longer has an audience.  Yet there 
seems no good reason why even those who accept such arguments should be inclined to 
sacrifice political ideals such as the commitment to collective self-rule.  For it is exactly 
under conditions of uncertainty that conflict over political ends becomes vital: where no 
single perspective can claim absolute authority, a horizon of possibilities opens out.  
Uncertainty entails not universal doubt – a most impractical disposition, as Wittgenstein 
reminds – but a recognition of the contestability of viewpoints, something which is not 
only consistent with normative creativity but conducive to ensuring that political conflict 
takes democratic forms.  Scholars of ideology inform us that the totalistic and rather 
fixed Weltanschauungen of the twentieth century may be fragmenting and waning, but 
emphasise the persistence of ideational formations of considerable structure and popular 
resonance (Freeden 2005). 
Likewise, one should be dubious about the idea that there are structural-
determinative reasons why contemporary parties are unable to play the motivational 
role.  To be sure, it seems that, due to changing patterns of economic production and 
increasing levels of migration, the well-defined mass social groupings associated with 
Fordist society are passing, thus disrupting some of the organisational and symbolic 
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resources on which parties of the recent past have been able to draw.  But this does not 
mean that mobilisation itself is no longer viable.  Quite the contrary, it increases the 
opportunities available to parties for creatively redefining the terms of political conflict.  
The decline of older social groupings and their attendant patterns of political behaviour, 
to the extent this can be observed (e.g. Franklin et al., 1992), is exactly what makes 
possible the articulation of new forms of collective identification which transcend 
partisanship in the sectarian sense.  A new political space is opening, one which enables 
appeals to wider groupings than those rooted in narrowly defined ethno-cultural or 
productivity-based criteria, and which prioritises bonds of choice over those of tradition 
and inheritance.  This space enables not only a politics of pragmatism, anodyne catch-
all-ism, or quasi-universalist technocracy, as many identify in contemporary Western 
societies, but its opposite: a clash of citizens who understand themselves as, and who are 
constructed by organised actors like parties as, advancing competing interpretations of 
the collective political good.  Mobilising citizens to this type of endeavour becomes 
increasingly possible as more sectarian forms of collective identification recede.  As a 
possibility proof, one may consider the example of Europe’s increasingly prominent 
‘new populist’ parties, which succeed in drawing together under the sign of ‘the people’ 
groups of citizens hitherto politically incompatible (Laclau 2005).  These parties’ 
capacity for mobilisation is unquestionable.  What they lack is a contribution to the 
normative and executive roles: they tend to have few clear political objectives beyond 
opposition to the existing system (Mudde 2004; Canovan 2005), and thus tend to be 
exposed as vacuous and substantively disappointing when extended a role in the 
formation of government policy. 
Finally, what of the argument that structural changes in the contemporary world 
have rendered impossible parties’ performance of the executive role?  Such a position is 
often taken in view of processes of globalisation and regional integration which increase 
the porousness of political boundaries and the complexity of decision-making.  In a 
world of transborder problems, ever more demanding swathes of information, and the 
consequent need for expert knowledge, bounded and election-oriented organisations 
may seem obsolete.  ‘Government’, it may be argued, must give way to ‘governance’, 
leading to a system where power is widely diffused, elections result neither in the visible 
formation of a party-led centre of authority nor a clearly defined opposition, and no 
single political actor can hope to influence the decision-making arena as before.  In such 
conditions, those who commit themselves to supporting a given party are denied the 
chance to see a tangible outcome to their efforts in the form of the coordinated 
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enactment of a political programme: hence there can be no executive source of 
commitment to political agency.  On the one hand, such reasoning seems to rests on an 
often exaggerated and determinist reading of the changes currently being experienced by 
states and their political institutions.  The retreat of state power is arguably far less 
advanced than such arguments suggest (Hirst and Thompson, 1999), and whatever 
pressures for such changes may exist have origins which are ideological at least as much 
as they are material (Hay 2007, chap. 4).  On the other hand, many such arguments rest 
on a rather limited conception of the possible forms of transnational institutional 
structures.  The fact that existing ones, for example those associated with the European 
Union, are arguably inadequately responsive to political contestation and the direct 
influence of parties does not mean that parties are no longer relevant to governmental 
decision-making.  Rather, as sites of decision-making power multiply, it is likely that 
parties will have an increasingly important role to play in linking up political conflict 
across different arenas of contestation.  What this requires is that parties use the existing 
influence they retain – indirectly through national governments, and through their ability 
to foster transnational networks – to redesign the system so as to increase its 
responsiveness to direct forms of influence.  Certainly there will be parties with 
principled objections to doing so, either because they are localist in orientation or 
because they are content to divest themselves of political responsibilities and powers – 
but this should not be mistaken for a structural imperative.   
The possibility of projecting the successful execution of political programmes 
through governments and legislative bodies remains and is necessary.  A democratic 
ethos can be maintained only where the citizenry retains control over the legislature and 
where governments are accountable to democratic will. Where legislatures have lost 
connection with the people, or where their capacity to orient the activity of governments 
has been supplanted by other domestic or international political actors, the democratic 
ethos suffers.  Even where such transformations have become an unavoidable part of 
political life, rather than being hailed, they should invite further reflection on the quality 
of democracy and its implications for citizens’ conviction in the worth of political 
agency.  
 
‘Only self-deception or hypocrisy,’ wrote Kelsen, ‘can lead one to believe that 
democracy is possible without political parties.  A democracy is necessarily and 
unavoidably a party state’ (Kelsen 2000, p.92).  E.E. Schattschneider, in a passage 
almost too famous to bear further repetition, likewise pronounced modern democracy 
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‘unthinkable’ save for parties (Schattschneider 1942, p.1).  As we have tried to show, 
numerous thinkers have made the link between the principle of democracy – collective 
self-rule – and the necessity of certain modes of civic engagement by which citizens 
mobilise for the purpose of realising an interpretation of the common good.  Yet it is 
with some irony that one notes that authors such as Kelsen and Schattschneider 
understood themselves explicitly as realists, stating truths which in the last instance 
could be defended as mere statements of the way things are.  Kelsen called his 
observation a ‘simple assertion of fact’, something ‘of which one can convince oneself 
by a glance at the development of all historical democracies’ (p.92).  Schattschneider’s 
convictions were similar.  Today, defenders of the normative and empirical significance 
of parties seem more likely to be cast in the role of nostalgics or utopians.  The 
temptation has been to downgrade the role of parties, and to overlook the reasons other 
than the purely procedural for why they became a central political feature.  The result 
has been that moves towards the individualisation and technocratisation of politics have 
been criticised without pairing this concern with an analysis of the modes of citizen 
engagement able to restore conviction in the worth of collective political agency.  
As our last remarks have indicated, an insistence on the centrality of parties for 
strengthening the democratic ethos seems anything but an exercise in yearning for an era 
past or fated never to come.  Though not strictly descriptive in its intent, the sketch 
given in this paper is by no means without empirical plausibility.  To be sure, as the 
forms of democracy change, parties must adapt to new conditions, and a more detailed 
examination of the options available to them is one of the tasks for future discussion.  
But it seems as premature to doubt parties’ capacity to adapt as it is ill-advised to 
overlook the importance of partisanship for collective self-rule.  The future of modern 
democracy remains inseparable from the future of the party.  
 
                                                 
1
 A number of interesting, theoretically-focused works on political parties have appeared in recent years, 
attempting to highlight and remedy the continued estrangement of debates in political theory from 
discussions of partisanship in comparative politics, as well as to challenge wider currents of scepticism 
towards partisanship as a democratic ideal.  (Muirhead 2006) and (Rosenblum 2008) have both 
contributed to a rehabilitation of the ethical standing of partisan activists, showing how many of the 
standard critiques of partisanship in political thought can be countered not just on realist grounds to do 
with the functional necessities of modern democracy, but with regard to the intrinsic virtues of 
participation in collective political action.  (Biezen and Saward 2008) have indicated the depth of the 
intellectual divide between democratic theorists and party scholars, as well as possible lines of re-
engagement based on examining the contribution of parties to matters of shared interest, notably political 
deliberation.  The present piece is of a different but complementary focus.  It concerns primarily the 
effects partisanship may have on the public beyond the party organisation, and reflects on citizens’ 
commitment not to particular standards of democratic practice (such as the deliberative ideal) but to the 
very principle of democracy, i.e. collective self-rule.  More importantly, our insistence on the unique 
combination of three different sources of conviction in the worth of collective political agency (normative, 
motivational and executive) traces the significance of partisanship back to the core idea of collective self-
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rule and to what we call the ‘democratic ethos’ which underpins it.  It allows a deeper appreciation of the 
distinctiveness of partisan engagement vis-a-vis other modes of civic participation, and thereby offers 
additional important reasons for taking seriously the democratic role of political parties. 
2
 Note that for the purposes of this paper it is unnecessary to draw a strong contrast between appeals to 
interests and values: both are interpretational acts which involve putting forward one of the many possible 
descriptions of the world, whether for the purposes of orientation or as a prelude to action.  
3
 This is why Kant cautions against authoritative figures trying to discourage citizens from articulating 
their judgments in a normative perspective (Kant 1784, p. 11 ff.). 
4
 Such is the implication of John Maynard Keynes’ famous observation that ‘practical men, who believe 
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist’  (Keynes 2007, p.383).  
5
 Parties in practice may of course betray such an ideal. If and when they do, the detachment of leaders 
from the normative goals endorsed by other members of the party is itself problematic. 
6
 The distinction between normative reason and motivation is a familiar one in political theory and bears 
particular weight in discussions concerning moral universalism and particularism. For further analysis of 
its implications see Ypi 2008, pp. 54-56. 
7
 The more sophisticated accounts of parties have recognised this (see Sartori 1976; Mair 1997, p.65), but 
it tends to be overlooked in contemporary accounts – perhaps because empirical research is considerably 
easier if a party’s normative position is taken to be measurable by socio-economic data about its members 
and voters. 
8
 Note then that this feature of parties allows decision-making to be both coherent and politicised.  In the 
absence of parties, and where the choice is between direct majoritarian voting and non-majoritarian 
deliberation, one may rightly fear a trade-off between the two (Pettit 2001).   
9
 One critique may be found in (Kelsen 2000, p. 93). 
10
 For example, it is possible to imagine deliberative polls being used to address both technical issues 
regarding ruling procedures like membership fees and financial subsidies, and more normative questions 
such as the content of electoral manifestos, specific policy-prescriptions and the selection of leaders. For 
further analysis of deliberation within parties see (Ware 1986) (Teorell 1998); for a sceptical view see 
(Hendriks et al. 2007). 
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